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Unions and Job Quality
Alex Bryson and Francis Green
7.1 . INTRODUCTION
Since the start of the 1980s there has been a transformation in the system of
employment relations in Britain. The dominant model in the post-war period,
which had been based ‘on the shared values of the legitimacy of representation
by independent trade unions and of joint regulation’ (Millward et al., 2000,
234), was substituted by an emerging system in which management commu-
nicates directly with employees via team brieﬁngs, town hall meetings, and
email, where employees look to their individual statutory rights for protection,
and where an employer-driven discourse on productivity growth via human
resource management is the dominant paradigm (Dickens and Hall, 2009;
Van Wanrooy et al., 2013; Willman et al., 2009; Wood and Bryson, 2009).
In this chapter we ask: what are the implications of this transformation for
the level and distribution of job quality? Unions have typically been regarded
as a force for equality and fairness at work. A decline in the relative size of the
union sector means a decline in union ‘reach’, and perhaps also of the extent to
which unions can make a difference within that reach. It may also entail a
reduction in any impact unions might have on the non-union sector.
The restructuring of employment relations is indeed reﬂected in falling
union density: between 1986 and 2012 across the economy the proportion
of employees who were union members declined by over one third from 45.6
per cent to 29.0 per cent (Skills Employment Surveys (SES)). The percentage of
employees in the unionized sector also declined, albeit less dramatically,
whether one deﬁnes the sector in terms of the workplace presence of unions
or of workplace recognition for pay bargaining (see Figure 7.1). Both the levels
of unionization and the pattern of decline shown in the SES broadly conﬁrm
what is known from other sources: a substantial de-unionization in the 1980s
and 1990s followed by a somewhat slower rate of decline in the 2000s
(Blanchﬂower and Bryson, 2009; Brown et al., 2009; Bryson and Forth, 2011;
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van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Schnabel (2013) shows that Britain is by no means
unusual in this respect: there has also been falling union density in much of the
advanced industrialized world over the last three decades.
It would be wrong, however, to imagine that unions have become a spent
force in the British economy. Even after this sustained period of union decline,
nearly half of all employees are working in a workplace where at least one
union is recognized for pay bargaining, while close to one third of all employ-
ees are union members. Furthermore, where unions remain in situ the trend
for union inﬂuence is theoretically open: it is likely to depend on the degree of
bargaining power unions wield in negotiations with employers. Only if there is
a reduction in bargaining power will there be a predicted reduction in inﬂu-
ence; according to some theories such a reduction is predicted by increasing
market competition, and by the loss of legal protections. Evidence from
workplace surveys point to a bifurcation in union strength in workplaces
where they still have a presence (Millward et al., 2000, chapter 5). In many
instances, where unions remain they are quite weak: negotiations with
employers are less common than they once were and, where they do occur,
the number of issues over which negotiation occurs has been falling (van
Wanrooy et al., 2013, 80–5). Yet many unions have maintained their organ-
izational strength on the ground. Union representation appears to have been
remarkably resilient in the face of recession (van Wanrooy et al., 2013, 65–7).
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Figure 7.1. Union Coverage, Recognition, and Membership, 1986–2012
Source: SES
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 9/2/2015, SPi
Unions and Job Quality 131
Comp. by: Jayapathirajan Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002478978 Date:9/2/15 Time:16:16:17
Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002478978.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 132
Against this backdrop, the aim of this chapter is to study the changing
association of unions with job quality, thereby to improve understanding of
the implications of union decline for inequality in the workplace. We draw on
a literature that has been primarily focused on unions’ effects on wages.
A broad aim of our analysis, beyond that of previous studies, is to examine
the changing associations between unions and several core domains of intrin-
sic job quality, as well as the association with job security. Given unions’
traditional effects on pay, we also contribute new analyses of unions’ effects on
wages, using the SES: we address the question of whether, as expected follow-
ing the posited reduction in bargaining power, the union wage premium has
declined over time; we also ask whether, along with union decline, there has
been a reduction in the extent to which trade unions reduce wage inequality.
We begin the chapter by reﬂecting on the changing nature of unionized
employment in Britain: we show that unionized employees are increasingly
likely to be found in the public service industries and that a growing propor-
tion are engaged in professional occupations. Taking note of, and controlling
for, these changes is important for the union/non-union comparisons to
follow. In section 7.3 we begin with the standard measure of union inﬂuence,
namely the union wage premium, and extend our analysis with a measure of
union inﬂuence over wage dispersion. Building up towards our broader
analysis of job quality other than pay, we then examine how employee
perceptions of unions’ inﬂuence on work organization have been changing.
Finding that, where they remain, the unions’ perceived inﬂuence on work
organization may even have increased since the early 1990s, we turn in section
7.5 to the core part of the chapter: the associations of union coverage with
work intensity, task discretion, opportunities for skill use, job insecurity, and
job learning requirements. Our ﬁndings enable us to draw some general
conclusions about how the changing employment relations system has been
associated with changing workplace inequalities.
7 .2 . WHO ARE UNION MEMBERS?
Not only has the union sector shrunk in the last quarter century, its compos-
ition has changed considerably, as is shown in Table 7.1. As earlier studies
have testiﬁed (e.g. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013;
Machin, 2000), union members have aged relative to their non-member
counterparts because unions have found it increasingly difﬁcult to organize
young workers. Whereas in 1986 less than half (48.5 per cent) of union
members were over forty, this proportion had risen to 62.9 per cent by 2012.
What was once a male-dominated movement, with 64.4 per cent male in 1986,
evolved into one with a male minority (47.0 per cent). The latter is partly
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associated with the increased concentration of union members in the public
service industries (health, education, and public administration) (from 32.3
per cent in 1986 to 59.3 per cent in 2012). These changes may be especially
salient when studying relationships between unionization and a range of
economic and social outcomes.
But perhaps most signiﬁcant for the study of job quality is the fact that the
type of occupations that are unionized has changed radically. The trade union
movement in Britain, like elsewhere, had its origins inmanual labour jobs, such
as coal mining and machine operatives, and in craft workers such as shoe-
makers and typesetters. Already by the mid-1980s this had begun to change: by
1986, one quarter (25.6 per cent) of union members were in professional or
associate professional occupations (this compared with less than one in six
non-members). Economic forces, most notably skills-biased technological
change and the shift to services which has characterized most advanced
Western economies, has led to increased demand for professional occupations.
This is apparent in the increased proportion of all employees in professional or
associate professional occupations. However, the penetration of professional
occupations is much more apparent in the union sector than it is in the non-
union sector. In 2012, whereas under a quarter of union non-members were
drawn from the ranks of the professions, this was the case for nearly one half
(47.9 per cent) of union members. What is more, this professionalization of
unionized employees occurred in both the public and the private sectors: it is
not solely due to the increased concentration of members in the public sector.
7 .3 . THE UNIONS AND WAGES
With the prevalence of unions in long-term decline over the last quarter
century, and the character of their membership changing, what has been
Table 7.1. Trends in the Characteristics of Union Members (Percentage of All Union
Members)
Aged forty or more Male Public service industries** Professional*
1986 48.5 64.4 32.1 25.6
1992 50.4 58.2 43.6 29.6
1997 53.2 54.2 43.8 34.8
2001 58.6 52.5 49.4 37.9
2006 61.4 48.4 57.8 41.8
2012 62.9 47.0 58.7 47.9
Notes: *professional or associate professional occupation; ** health, education, and public administration.
Source: SES
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happening to their association with job quality? Before examining unions’
associations with broader, non-pay aspects of job quality, we look ﬁrst at the
links with wages.
7.3.1. The Union Wage Premium
Unions’ ability to procure a wage premium for covered employees is often
regarded as the touchstone for union inﬂuence among economists and
scholars of industrial relations, primarily because it is a chief objective of
union bargaining. The empirical literature addressing this issue is considerable
(for a review, see Bryson, 2014), and one of the issues in comparing studies has
been that heterogeneous ﬁndings can be attributed either to differences in
speciﬁcations or to data differences. To examine whether the union wage
premium has been changing over time, therefore, it is useful to be able to
use consistent data and adopt the same methodology with successive cross-
sectional waves of data. The SES series is one that affords a further opportunity
for such an analysis.
Table 7.2 presents union wage effects for the quarter century ending in
2012, ﬁrst for the whole economy and then for the public service and ‘private’
(i.e. other) industries separately. In each case the ﬁrst column presents the raw
wage gap between covered and uncovered employees (columns 1, 3, and 5).
The next column (columns 2, 4, and 6) presents the union wage premium,
which is the wage gap adjusting for observable differences in the demographic
and job attributes of covered and uncovered employees.
Table 7.2. The Union Coverage Wage Premium
All All Public service industries Other industries
(1)
Raw wage
gap
(2)
With
controls
(3)
Raw wage
gap
(4)
With
controls
(5)
Raw wage
gap
(6)
With
controls
1986 0.204*** 0.084*** 0.398*** 0.144*** 0.168*** 0.052***
1992 0.214*** 0.104*** 0.334*** 0.154*** 0.179*** 0.078***
1997 0.226*** 0.093*** 0.441*** 0.112*** 0.180*** 0.079***
2001 0.117*** 0.039*** 0.321*** 0.116*** 0.046** 0.007
2006 0.143*** 0.026** 0.301*** 0.093*** 0.079*** 0.006
2012 0.166*** 0.040** 0.238*** 0.094*** 0.119*** 0.022
Notes: the dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage; controls in columns (2), (4), and (6) are for the
highest education level, a quadratic in work experience, gender, white/non-white, size (four categories), one-
digit occupation, region, and one-digit industry; asterisks give the signiﬁcance of union/non-union gap, at * =
10 per cent, ** = 5 per cent, *** = 1 per cent.
Source: SES
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Back in 1986 the raw union wage gap was 0.204 log points (that is, 22.6 per
cent) in the whole economy (row 1, column 1), but the premium is only two
ﬁfths of this (0.084 log points) having adjusted for the wage-enhancing
attributes of covered employees relative to uncovered employees. By 2012
the raw wage gap had fallen a little to 0.166 log points, but the regression-
adjusted premium had fallen more sharply to 0.04 log points, a gap which is
only statistically signiﬁcant at a 10 per cent conﬁdence interval.1 Similar
patterns of decline are apparent in both the private and public industries,
indicating that the trend is not simply due to the changing composition of
jobs. However, the premium tends to be larger in the public service industries
than elsewhere. Furthermore, whereas the public services union wage pre-
mium remained statistically signiﬁcant throughout the period, the union wage
premium elsewhere in the economy disappeared in the late 1990s and has
never resurfaced.
These ﬁndings are consistent with other studies for Britain showing a
substantial decline in the union wage premium in recent decades (e.g.
Blanchﬂower and Bryson, 2007, 2009, 2010; Bryson and Forth, 2011; Forth
and Millward, 2002; Hildreth, 1999). However, many of these studies focus on
the premium attached to union membership, as opposed to union coverage,
and a number ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant, if reduced, premium persists.2
7.3.2. Unions and Wage Dispersion
The union wage premium is one channel through which unions might
impinge on wage inequalities between jobs. In addition, unions’ wage policies
may be directly aimed at reducing inequalities in the workplaces where they
have bargaining inﬂuence. Their wage policies are often guided by the prin-
ciple of a ‘fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’, such that wages are attached to
jobs rather than individuals’ attributes. This wage standardization policy,
coupled with concerns to tackle wage discrimination on grounds of race,
gender, and disability, can compress wage differentials. Yet, with unions’
prevalence falling, the wage premium lower, and, potentially, unions’ reduced
power to impose solidarity-preserving settlements on employers, it could be
expected that unions’ overall effect on wage inequality has declined.
1 The uptick in the premium between 2006 and 2012 is consistent with counter-cyclical
movement in the wage premium, as discussed by Blanchﬂower and Bryson (2007).
2 We obtained results that are similar to those presented in Table 7.2 by replacing the union
coverage measure—which is based on whether a union or staff association is present at the
workplace—with a measure of union recognition identifying whether a union or staff association
is recognized by management for negotiating pay and/or conditions of employment. The union
recognition measure is not available prior to 1997.
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Examining the practical force of unions’ solidarity policies is, however, by
no means straightforward. It is difﬁcult to disentangle the causal effect of
unions on wage compression from the fact that unions may be more likely to
organize homogeneous workers, and these may be drawn from the middle of
the wage distribution. Whether unions actually compress wage differentials
depends on the position of unionized workers in the pay distribution, the
union wage premium attached to different types of worker, and the degree of
centralization and coordination in collective bargaining. Notwithstanding
these methodological issues, there is evidence that unions have contributed
substantially to wage compression, both in the UK and elsewhere, and that
they continue to do so (Bryson and Forth, 2011; Card et al., 2004; Gosling and
Machin, 1995). Moreover, the decline in unionization is found to have con-
tributed substantially to the growth in wage inequality in the United States
(Frandsen, 2012) and in Germany (Dustmann et al., 2009), and there is some
evidence that union decline in Britain was a factor (in addition to rising
relative demand for highly educated labour) behind the rapidly increased
wage inequality that occurred in Britain from the early 1980s onwards
(Leslie and Pu, 1995; Lindley and Machin, 2013; Machin, 1997).
To establish the effect of union coverage on the changes in wage dispersion
over time in Britain we compare the dispersion of wages in the covered and
uncovered sectors at the start and end of the SES series. Having combined the
datasets for 1986 and 1992 for the early period, and the 2006–2012 data for the
end period, we use the reweighting estimator originally deployed by DiNardo
et al. (1996) to construct counterfactual wage distributions for uncovered
employees which proxy the wage distribution that would have obtained in
the absence of unions in the economy. This is achieved by reweighting
uncovered employees such that their observable characteristics closely resem-
ble those of their covered counterparts.3 One can then recover the ‘effect’ of
union coverage at different parts of the wage distribution by comparing the
actual distribution of wages to the counterfactual distribution which would
have obtained if uncovered employees were observationally equivalent to
those who are covered. Comparisons of the actual wage distribution and the
counterfactual wage distribution allow us to identify that part of the wage gap
between covered and uncovered employees that is attributable to union
coverage, as opposed to differences in their observable characteristics.
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 7.3. The top half of
Table 7.3 presents results for the 90/50 percentile wage ratio, a measure of
wage dispersion at the top end of the distribution. The ﬁrst row in Table 7.3
indicates that, back in 1986–1992 the 90/50 percentile ratio was considerably
3 This is achieved by running a probit estimate for the probability of being covered by a union
and then using the predicted probabilities to reweight the uncovered employees in such a way as
to give additional weight to those with high estimated probabilities of being covered.
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higher among uncovered employees than it was among covered employees
(2.01 vs. 1.80). The ﬁnal column of the row shows the ratio in the uncovered
sector falls once uncovered employees are reweighted such that they resemble
covered employees on their observable attributes. Following reweighting the
90/50 ratio among uncovered employees falls from 0.706 to 0.665. Thus,
around two thirds of the difference in the 90/50 percentile ratio between
covered and uncovered employees in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
attributable to differences in the observable characteristics between the two
sets of employees; the remaining one third may be attributable to the role of
trade unions in compressing differentials in the top half of the earnings
distribution.
The second row indicates that wages had become more unequal in the top
half of the wage distribution by 2006–2012 in both the covered and uncovered
sectors: the 90/50 ratios are 1.86 and 2.38 respectively. The growth in wage
dispersion was more pronounced among uncovered employees, but much of
this was driven by the characteristics of employees in the uncovered sector.
Once uncovered employees are reweighted so that they are observationally
equivalent to covered employees, the 90/50 ratio is 2.16. Comparing the 90/50
ratio in the covered sector with the counterfactual distribution among un-
covered employees (see column (4)), it is apparent that the non-union/union
dispersion gap had risen from twenty-two to thirty percentage points over the
period. Thus, in the upper half of the distribution, union presence seems to
have been a break upon the rising dispersion of wages.
A contrasting story is shown in the second panel of Table 7.3, where the
bottom half of the wage distribution is captured by the 50/10 percentile ratio.
Back in the late 1980s/early 1990s the distribution of wages in the bottom half
of the distribution was very similar in the covered and uncovered sectors (with
Table 7.3. Union Coverage and Wage Dispersion, 1986–2012 (Ratios of Hourly
Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentile
ratio
Waves Covered Not
covered
Not covered,
counterfactual
Non-union/union
dispersion gap (3)–(1)
90th/50th 1986/92 1.798 2.007 2.017 0.220
2006/12 1.860 2.379 2.162 0.303
50th/10th 1986/92 1.626 1.640 1.754 0.129
2006/12 1.720 1.601 1.830 0.103
50th/5th 1986/92 1.848 1.922 2.189 0.342
2006/12 1.896 1.684 1.964 0.067
Notes: the probit to construct the weights for the ‘not covered/counterfactual’ sample uses for covariates the
same controls as in Table 7.2. All estimates are based on a sample with non-missing values for wages and all
controls (n = 7,205 for 1986/1992; n = 9,031 for 2006/2012).
Source: SES
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50/10 percentile ratios of 1.63 and 1.64, respectively). However, the counter-
factual 50/10 distribution for uncovered employees was more dispersed (1.75),
indicating that uncovered employees possessed observable traits which led to
lower wage dispersion than the characteristics possessed by covered employees
in that part of the wage distribution. Consequently, having reweighted un-
covered employees so that they shared the characteristics of covered employ-
ees, the 50/10 percentile ratio was around thirteen percentage points greater
among uncovered employees compared with that for covered employees. By
2006/12, however, this non-union/union dispersion gap had fallen a little to
ten percentage points over the period.
One potential reason for this relative closing of the non-union/union
dispersion gap as indicated by the 50/10 ratio could be the differential impact
the national minimum wage had on lower earners, particularly those in the
uncovered sector. To test this explanation, we also examined the 50/5 per-
centile ratio, since the minimum wage is directly relevant at the 5th percentile,
but only applies at the 10th percentile in so far as its effects are extended to
those earning above the minimum. As expected, the non-union/union disper-
sion gap for the 50/5 ratio fell by a much greater extent, from thirty-four to just
seven percentage points over the period.
7 .4 . DO UNIONS STILL INFLUENCE
THE WAY WORK IS ORGANIZED?
While unions’ inﬂuence over pay has declined, it remains possible that they
have retained or even increased their inﬂuence on other aspects of job quality,
by changing the emphasis of their activities, for example by increasing their
involvement through representing and supporting their members directly in
forms of workplace participation, or in their personal development through
training, or in grievance procedures.
Unions’ inﬂuence over work organization is of course by no means new. For
a number of years lower labour productivity in the unionized sector relative to
the non-unionized sector was attributed by many to unions’ ‘restrictive prac-
tices’, union-negotiated rules which limited managers’ ambit for reorganizing
work. Some of these practices were intended to protect craft skills while others
maintained what appeared to be fairly arbitrary distinctions between occupa-
tional classes at the workplace. Such negative effects were set against possible
productivity-enhancing effects of efﬁcient union communication—the conse-
quence of ‘union voice’. Many studies of unions’ productivity effects have
ensued, with heterogeneous ﬁndings across countries, though the balance of
evidence from past British studies appears to support a negative effect
(Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003).
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Arguably, however, these effects have been changing. In the mid-1980s
there were signs that unions were ﬁnding it increasingly difﬁcult to maintain
restrictive practices (Metcalf, 1989). More recently, it has been commonly
maintained that the closure of the labour productivity gap between the union
and non-union sectors is attributable, at least in part, to the reassertion of
management’s ‘right-to-manage’ in the union sector (Blanchﬂower and
Bryson, 2009). Throughout the 2000s unions have devoted resources—with
the help of government subsidies—to supporting and facilitating training via
their union learning representatives. In short, with the declining prevalence
and bargaining power of unions, and with the evolution of unions’ policies, it
is of interest to ask how unions’ inﬂuence over matters of work organization
has been changing, as a preliminary to investigating unions’ relationship to
broader, non-wage aspects of job quality that are associated with work
organization.
The SES series provides some direct evidence of employees’ perceptions
about trade union inﬂuence which, though it may be coloured by employees’
limited awareness of what unions may be achieving, is nonetheless inform-
ative. Respondents in union-covered workplaces were asked (in 1992 and from
2001): ‘How much inﬂuence do the trade unions in your establishment have
over the way work is organized?’ In 1992 a quarter responded that unions had
‘a great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ of inﬂuence. By 2001 this proportion had risen
to 36.1 per cent, and thereafter reported inﬂuence changed rather little. In
short it seems that, where they have remained present, many unions have
continued to make their presence felt. The rise in perceived inﬂuence between
1992 and the 2000s occurred largely within industries and was not associated
in any way with changes in industrial structure.
There were also plenty of employees in covered workplaces at the other end
of the scale who perceived that unions had no inﬂuence at all—32.2 per cent in
1992, falling to 27.0 per cent in 2012.4 This evidence of heterogeneity in
perceived union inﬂuence on work organization is consistent with the evi-
dence from the Workplace Employment Relations Study (WERS) surveys
(Millward et al., 2000). We investigated whether the pattern of heterogeneity
varied much between industries, ﬁnding some notable variation. Taking the
2001–2012 period as a whole, the proportion reporting no trade union
inﬂuence over work organization, which averaged 26.1 per cent over the
decade, was high in the hotels industry (44.9 per cent) and low in transport
and communications (16.6 per cent). Among occupations, the groups with the
most reporting no trade union inﬂuence were sales (30.6 per cent) and
personal services (32.6 per cent).
4 These proportions at the low end of the scale include those answering ‘don’t know’. From
2001 onwards, while the item and scale were identical to those of 1992, the item was part of a
smaller batch of items than in 1992.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 9/2/2015, SPi
Unions and Job Quality 139
Comp. by: Jayapathirajan Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002478978 Date:9/2/15 Time:16:16:18
Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002478978.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 140
What might account for the rise in the 1990s and subsequent resilience of
perceived union inﬂuence over work organization? One possibility is that
many unions have learned to compensate for a possible decline in their
bargaining power by becoming more efﬁcient—perhaps learning to do more
with less. Unions’ policies may also be evolving to cope with and compensate
for their declining bargaining power. Whatever the reason, evidence from
elsewhere conﬁrms that unions remain capable of having a substantial inﬂu-
ence in the workplace. For example, the WERS indicate that around half of
employees agree that the unions at their workplace are ‘taken seriously by
management’, a ﬁgure that has not changed signiﬁcantly since the late 1990s
(Bryson and Forth, forthcoming). The British Social Attitudes Survey indicates
that the percentage of employees saying the workplace union is doing its job
well has been rising since 1997 and stood at seven in ten by 2008 (Bryson and
Forth, 2011, 264).
7 .5 . THE NON-WAGE QUALITY OF
UNION AND NON-UNION JOBS
If unions persist in their effects on work organization, it seems worth asking
whether there are signiﬁcant differences between unionized and non-union-
ized jobs in respect of important aspects of job quality other than pay, and if so
whether this link has been decreasing alongside unions’ diminishing inﬂuence
on pay, or conversely rising in partial compensation.
A priori it is unclear whether one might expect union jobs to be of higher or
lower non-wage quality than the jobs undertaken by those in the uncovered
sector. On the one hand, it is known that poor job quality and bad manage-
ment are strongly linked with the desire for union representation in the United
States and Britain (Bryson and Freeman, 2013). Although poor non-wage job
quality can be addressed by unions through their inﬂuence over work organ-
ization, their determination and power to do so may be weak. In the case of job
security, unions start off at a disadvantage in that jobs growth is traditionally
slower among unionized workplaces compared with non-unionized work-
places (Bryson, 2004); in such circumstances attempts by unions to obtain
job security guarantee clauses are no more than a rearguard action to ameli-
orate an already weak situation. Traditionally, unions sought instead to obtain
compensating ﬁnancial rewards for poor working conditions through the
wage–effort bargain. Even if unions were concerned about aspects of job
quality, one could anticipate that their reduced bargaining power has dimin-
ished their ability to engineer improvements in all aspects of job quality, not
just wages. Thus one might expect unionized employees to be subject to
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poorer job quality than non-unionized employees, and that this difference
would increase as their bargaining power declines.
On the other hand, a contrasting hypothesis is that unions have shifted their
attention away from pay bargaining (van Wanrooy et al., 2013, 86–7, 91–4),
and started to focus more on improving other aspects of job quality, such as
access to training or safe working conditions. Employers might also welcome
union interest in non-pay job quality if it leads to higher productivity, either
directly through ‘smarter’ working or indirectly via higher employee well-
being.5 There is evidence, also, that unions did indeed start to help managers
innovate through the adoption of productivity-enhancing high involvement
management practices—practices, such as autonomous team working, which
aim to engage workers more fully in the tasks they are performing (Wood and
Bryson, 2009). Opportunities for union inﬂuence were still apparent in 2011
since employers were signiﬁcantly more likely to negotiate or consult over
labour-related organizational changes where employee representatives were
present at the workplace (van Wanrooy et al., 2013, 72–3). To the extent that
this inﬂuence has been effective, one might expect that unionized workers
would enjoy higher non-wage job quality than their non-union counterparts.
The association between unionization and non-wage job quality is, then,
theoretically ambivalent. Yet the relationship has attracted much less attention
in empirical studies than the links between unions and pay. For example, in a
recent broad-ranging follow-up to Freeman and Medoff ’s (1984) seminal
What Do Unions Do? (Bennett and Kaufman, 2007), references to non-wage
job quality are rare. Instead, a large part of the volume is devoted to the
relationship between unionization and job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is often
treated as a proxy for overall job quality in the union literature and elsewhere
(for a discussion see Brown et al., 2007). This can be problematic because
employee responses to job satisfaction questions are informed not just by the
quality of their jobs but by other considerations such as their expectations
(Brown et al., 2012; Green, 2006). Furthermore, any relationship between
unionization and job satisfaction is hard to interpret as a job quality effect
because, by offering employees an opportunity to address poor job quality via
bargaining and worker voice, dissatisﬁed union employees are less likely to
quit than dissatisﬁed non-union employees (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).
Consequently, the stock of dissatisﬁed employees is likely to be higher in a
unionized environment than a non-unionized environment, even if under-
lying job quality is similar. This is not to say we learn nothing about union
effects on job quality from the job satisfaction literature. Recent studies for
5 There is evidence that organizational changes are associated with increased job-related
anxiety and lower job satisfaction, but that these effects are ameliorated when employees work
in a unionized workplace and are involved in the introduction of the changes (Bryson et al.,
2013).
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Britain which account for ﬁxed unobservable differences between union and
non-union employees indicate that union-covered employees are more satis-
ﬁed with their pay and hours of work than ‘like’ uncovered employees,
although they appear less satisﬁed with their job security and there are some
indications of adaptation to coverage over time (Bryson and White, 2013;
Powdthavee, 2011).
Another strand of the literature ﬁnds that unions are associated with better
fringe beneﬁts such as holiday entitlements, pension provision, and extra-
statutory sick pay (Bryson and Forth, forthcoming; Forth and Millward, 2000;
Green and Potepan, 1988). Fringe beneﬁts were often subject to union bar-
gaining, but the scope of bargaining on such issues has declined in the private
sector since the early 2000s (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013, 80–2), which may be
another indicator of diminishing union inﬂuence at the workplace.
Much less is known about differences in the intrinsic job quality of union-
ized and non-unionized jobs. Often union status may appear in an analysis of
job quality as a background control variable occasioning little comment.
Nevertheless, there is a growing realization that unions can play an important
role in affecting job quality via both their voice and bargaining roles at the
workplace. For example, using linked employer–employee data from WERS
2004 Green and Whitﬁeld (2009) ﬁnd that, other things equal, employees in
workplaces with recognized unions are more likely to say they have no time to
complete tasks and are less likely to agree that they have inﬂuence over the
pace of work and how tasks are done. They concur with C. Wright Mills’
observation that unions are often ‘managers of discontent’ (Green and
Whitﬁeld, 2009, 228).
The focus of the evidence presented in Table 7.4, derived from the SES data,
is on four core aspects of intrinsic job quality: the effort required to undertake
the job, the degree of control the employee has over when and how the job
tasks are performed, and the degree to which the employee can use or develop
his or her skills in the job. We also examine the association with job security.
The indicators for the ﬁve facets of job quality are deﬁned in the notes below
Table 7.4. The levels of job quality in the union-covered and uncovered sectors
are provided in columns 1 and 2, respectively, with the raw gap between the
two sectors presented in column 3. The regression-adjusted gap in job quality
between covered and uncovered employees is presented in the ﬁnal column,
which conditions on the same control variables that were used to estimate the
union wage premium. We take each of the ﬁve facets of job quality in turn.
Effort: the effort–reward trade-off is, arguably, at the core of collective
bargaining. Unions traditionally sought to limit work intensiﬁcation on the
part of employers to improve their members’ health and safety and to counter
‘ratchet effects’ whereby employers paying piece rates continually cut piece
rates for a given level of output (Carmichael and MacLeod, 2000). The top
panel of Table 7.4 shows the proportion of union- and non-union-covered
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employees who strongly agreed that ‘My job requires that I work very hard’.
This proportion has been rising over time among both union-covered and
uncovered employees, a trend that can be attributed to effort-biased techno-
logical change and to closer monitoring of work effort (Green, 2006). How-
ever, intensiﬁcation has been more rapid among covered employees such that,
Table 7.4. Unions and Non-Wage Job Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-union Union Raw gap ((2)–(1)) With controls
Efforta
1992 0.307 0.290 0.017 0.038*
1997 0.379 0.404 0.025 0.013
2001 0.368 0.384 0.016 0.007
2006 0.388 0.432 0.043*** 0.018
2012 0.396 0.505 0.110*** 0.093***
Task discretionb
1992 2.48 2.43 0.057*** 0.077***
1997 2.32 2.23 0.089*** 0.152***
2001 2.25 2.14 0.109*** 0.086***
2006 2.22 2.16 0.069*** 0.055**
2012 2.25 2.18 0.074** 0.053*
Opportunity for skill usec
2001 0.338 0.330 0.0089 0.0475***
2006 0.399 0.405 0.0066 0.0387**
2012 0.392 0.455 0.0629 0.0212
Insecurityd
1986 0.212 0.209 0.0026 0.0118
1997 0.224 0.238 0.0141 0.0232
2001 0.160 0.181 0.0213 0.0287**
2006 0.172 0.187 0.0153 0.0272**
2012 0.220 0.271 0.0514*** 0.0278
Learning requiremente
1992 0.239 0.270 0.0310* 0.0204
2001 0.259 0.334 0.0741*** 0.0258
2006 0.305 0.379 0.0746*** 0.0174
2012 0.278 0.424 0.1458*** 0.0597**
Notes: for column (4), each job quality indicator was regressed against union coverage and the control
variables from Table 7.2. Asterisks give signiﬁcance of union/non-union gap, at * = 10 per cent, ** = 5 per
cent, *** = 1 per cent. The job quality indicators are deﬁned as follows:
a. The proportion who strongly agree that ‘my job requires that I work very hard’.
b. The task discretion index combines the responses to four items capturing worker inﬂuence over tasks
performed. The index ranges from 0 to 3.
c. Opportunity for skills use: proportion who strongly agree that ‘In my current job I have enough
opportunity to use the knowledge and skills that I have’.
d. The proportion who report that there is ‘any chance at all’ of losing their job and becoming unemployed
in the next twelve months.
e. The proportion who strongly agree that ‘my job requires that I keep learning new things’.
Source: SES
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by the early 2000s, unionized jobs were statistically signiﬁcantly more de-
manding of hard work than non-unionized jobs. This difference is accounted
for by other observable differences between union and non-union employees.
However, by 2012 unionized jobs had become even more hard-working, and
the difference could no more be attributed to differences in individual and job
characteristics.6 This increased intensity of unionized labour relative to non-
unionized labour does not seem to have been compensated for by a higher
union wage premium (see section 7.3), and is consistent with declining union
power within the effort–wage bargain.
Task discretion: the second panel in Table 7.4 records the degree to which
employees have task discretion, as measured by their personal inﬂuence over
how hard they work, which tasks they perform, the order they perform them
in and the quality standards to which the employee works (see Technical
Appendix). Task discretion declined in the 1990s in both union and non-
union jobs, a fall noted in earlier work (Gallie et al., 2004) and attributable to
multiple factors, including the evolving culture of management through tight
targets. Over and above the theoretical ambivalence surrounding unions’
association with non-wage job quality, an additional consideration is that
employers may feel a greater need to monitor and control employees when
they are unionized and are thus less likely to cede discretion to them relative
to ‘like’ non-unionized employees. In the event, throughout the period task
discretion has been lower in unionized jobs than it was in non-unionized jobs.
The size of this gap in column 3 moves around from year to year but follows
no clear pattern. The same is true when controls are added, and the controls
make little difference to the size of the gap.
Opportunities for skills use: opportunities for employees to use their know-
ledge and skills have been rising since 2001 in both union and non-union jobs
(third panel in Table 7.4). In the early 2000s there was virtually no difference
in the raw skills use gap between union and non-union employees. However,
controlling for demographic and job traits union jobs offered signiﬁcantly
fewer opportunities to use skills than non-union jobs in both 2001 and 2006.
This had changed by 2012: opportunities to use skills continued to grow after
2006 in unionized jobs whereas they remained static in non-union jobs. The
regression-adjusted gap favours union jobs but it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Job insecurity: as can be seen from the fourth panel in Table 7.4, employee
perceptions of job insecurity tend to move counter-cyclically reﬂecting the
reality that job loss is more likely in recession, though 1997 is an exception
with rather high insecurity (Green et al., 2000). In the two decades through to
2006 there is no signiﬁcant difference in perceived job insecurity between
6 The same story of unionized jobs getting harder in the 2000s is also found when using a
broader index of effort. However, this index is not available before 2001, so to get a longer
historical sweep, we use the single catch-all item.
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union-covered and uncovered employees; however, after having controlling
for differences in the demographic and work characteristics of unionized and
non-unionized employees, those in the covered sector experienced greater
insecurity than their uncovered counterparts in 2001 and 2006. Thereafter,
there emerged a substantive union–non-union gap in job insecurity which,
however, is much lower and insigniﬁcant after controls (including for public
sector employment) are added. The squeeze on public spending, which led to
big rises in job insecurity in the public sector (van Wanrooy et al., 2013; Gallie
et al., 2013) may account for this pattern.
Job learning requirements: the ﬁnal panel in Table 7.4 shows that the
proportion of jobs with high learning requirements increased between 1992
and 2006, a trend consistent with skill-biased technological change and with
theories of the knowledge economy (Felstead et al., 2007, 2014a). It has
sometimes been suggested that ‘unions, through narrow job classiﬁcations
and restrictive work rules, limit union workers’ full use of their skills and
abilities, and offer few opportunities for challenge, achievement, autonomy
and promotions’ (Hammer and Avgar, 2007, 349). Yet Table 7.4 also shows
that union jobs tend to be more stretching than non-union jobs in terms of the
need to keep learning new things. The growth in learning requirements has
been faster in unionized workplaces, implying that the raw gap in the learning
requirement has been growing; this might have helped spawn the growth of
union learning reps (Wallis et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the changing character
of the union sector accounts for the gap until 2006, since the regression-
adjusted gap remained insigniﬁcant. Thereafter, the regression-adjusted dif-
ference becomes statistically signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst time in 2012.
7 .6 . CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have examined the changing relationship of trade unions
with several core aspects of job quality, including wages, in order to add to
understanding about how workplace inequalities have been evolving over the
last quarter century.
There are two main limitations to our analyses and the conclusions that can
be drawn. First, the associations, even after controlling for many observed
differences between union and non-union workplaces, cannot be claimed as
unbiased measures of the causal inﬂuence of unions; in the case of some
aspects of non-wage job quality there are good reasons to expect that union-
ization is partly a reﬂection of poor conditions rather than the other
way round.
Second, our analysis has been focused on individual effects, and therefore
captures neither the spill-over effect of unions on non-union workplaces, nor
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the indirect political inﬂuence of unions on the formation of employment
rights legislation. Since the latter was an important part of the changing
regulatory environment during the period of the Labour government follow-
ing 1997, the (contested) inﬂuence of unions on Labour party policy in this
period would need to be taken into account in a broader analysis of unions’
inﬂuence on job quality. Even though unions’ political inﬂuence is undoubt-
edly much reduced from its earlier high points, the signiﬁcance for job quality
of the 1998 minimum wages regulation, and of the subsequent legislation for
fair treatment of part-time, ﬁxed-term, and agency workers (whose formula-
tion will have been inﬂuenced to some extent by trade union pressures) would
form part of such a comprehensive account.
Despite these caveats, the evidence is consistent with the view that the
declining bargaining power and reach of unions has reduced but by no
means eliminated the extent to which they can have an impact on job quality
and on workplace inequality. Summarizing our ﬁndings, unionized jobs began
the period with a signiﬁcant advantage over non-unionized jobs in wages,
somewhat lower effort, and no disadvantage in security. Matters deteriorated
for union-covered workers during the 1990s. Effort has greatly intensiﬁed in
union jobs since 1992, and these jobs were also beginning by the end of our
period to look relatively less secure than in the non-union sector. Unionized
jobs were subject to lower task discretion, perhaps reﬂecting the fact that
management had asserted greater control, where once they had been weak.
There is, however, some evidence of compensatory relative improvement in
their position in respect of skill use and increased exposure to a learning
requirement. By the end of the period the wage premium had also been
substantially eroded, averaging at around 4 per cent and becoming vanishingly
small outside the public service industries.
Nevertheless, throughout the period wage dispersion was lower among
covered employees than it was among similar uncovered employees. In the
upper half of the distribution, union coverage acted as a break on increasing
wage dispersion, in that the rise in pay inequality was greater where unions
were absent. In the lower half of the wage distribution the wage-compressing
effect of union coverage diminished. This reduction in wage compression is
most apparent in respect of the 50th/5th percentile of the wage distribution,
and hence seems likely to have been associated with the introduction of the
union-supported national minimum wage.
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